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ARBITRATION: LEARNING FROM THE DALLAH CASE
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Rarely, over the decades following its entry into force, was the 1958 United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, or New York Convention,1 the subject of a judgment of the UK House of
Lords.2 Yet, within barely over a year after its succession to the House of Lords
in October 2009, the United Kingdom Supreme Court delivered a judgment that
may not make up for all that lost time, but is deeply instructive nonetheless. The
decision in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. Ministry of
Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan3 became the vehicle for the Court to
lay down important markers not only for arbitration with sovereign entities, but
for the judicial role in the enforcement of foreign awards generally.
On the facts, Dallah looks very much like just another entry in a long series of
arbitral awards tackling the issue of the separateness of States from their agencies
and instrumentalities. The issue has been a recurrent one because, by the time a
dispute arises and an arbitration ensues, the instrumentality that is the signatory
party is often no longer an attractive respondent. It may lack assets to pay an
award, and it may not even any longer exist. After briefly setting out the facts of
the case and its procedural history in Part II of this article, I explore in Part III
Dallah’s significance in this first respect.
As will be seen, the UK Supreme Court in Dallah denied enforcement against
the Government of Pakistan of an arbitral award rendered in France, on the ground
that the Government – a non-signatory to the underlying arbitration agreement
signed by one of its instrumentalities – was never bound by that agreement and
therefore not liable for the award. The UK decision is all the more revealing in
this respect since, only a few months later and in full awareness of the UK
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judgment, the Cour d’appel of Paris rejected the Government of Pakistan’s
attempt to have the award annulled in France on that very ground.4 The UK
Court’s apparent misapprehension of French law – the law that according to all
parties governed the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over the Government – in itself
raises intriguing questions.
Although the French Cour d’appel’s rejection of the UK Supreme Court’s
reasoning and result lends the Dallah case its special resonance in international
arbitration circles, the UK ruling is also of interest insofar as it addresses issues of
broader significance to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
One of these issues is the difference, if any, between the standard of review over
the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement exercised by the courts of
the place of arbitration, on the one hand, and a foreign court at the time of
enforcement, on the other. A second and closely related issue is the weight, if
any, that the enforcing court should give to the findings of the tribunal on those
questions. These are the subjects of Part IV.
II. THE FACTS
The dispute in Dallah had its origins in a 1996 contract between Dallah and
an entity (“the Trust”) created for purposes of the contract by the Government of
Pakistan. The agreement provided for the construction of lodgings for pilgrims
visiting holy places in Saudi Arabia. The arrangement was negotiated between
Dallah and the Government, and memorialized in a 1995 Memorandum of
Understanding between them. Following certain preparations by Dallah, largely in
the form of land acquisition, the President of Pakistan promulgated an Ordinance,
effective in February 1996, establishing the Trust as the vehicle for the contract
with Dallah. (Under the Constitution of Pakistan, such an Ordinance would
automatically expire four months after its promulgation unless expressly renewed.
In fact the ordinance was renewed twice, in May and in August 1996.)
Further negotiations between Dallah and the Government ensued, and
agreement on the contract was reached. In April 1996, Dallah instructed its
lawyers to draft an agreement between Dallah and the Trust on the agreed upon
terms. The contract, entered into in September 1996 by Dallah and the Trust,
provided for the arbitration of disputes between the parties in France under the
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. It also entitled the Trust to
assign or transfer its rights and obligations under the contract to the Government
of Pakistan without Dallah’s prior consent. But in November 1996, the
government of Benazir Bhutto fell from power, and the new Pakistani government
did not renew the Ordinance that had established the Trust. As a result the Trust
ceased to exist as a legal entity on December 11, 1996. A series of suits was
brought in the courts of Pakistan either in the name of the Trust or of the
4
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Government, both before and after the Trust’s passage out of legal existence. The
first two actions sought a declaration that Dallah had itself committed a
fundamental breach of contract, thus repudiating the contract, while the third
sought a declaration that the Government was and is not bound by the contract
between Dallah and the Trust. In fact, none of the three actions produced a
judgment on the merits.
In May 1998, Dallah initiated arbitration in France against the Government for
breach of contract. The Government did not nominate an arbitrator, and the ICC
Court of Arbitration did so in its place. It also did not sign the Terms of Reference
or participate in any way in the proceedings. In a first partial award on jurisdiction
dated June 26, 2001, the arbitral tribunal found the Government to be a party to
the contract and its arbitration agreement, thus affirming its own jurisdiction. It
issued a second partial award, on liability, on January 19, 2004. A final award
followed on June 23, 2006. The tribunal awarded the claimant U.S. $20,588,040.
Dallah then sought enforcement of the award in the UK. Provisional
permission to enforce the award was granted in October 2006, but the
Government objected, claiming that it was not a party to the underlying contract
between Dallah and the Trust, and therefore neither under an obligation to submit
to arbitration of disputes arising out of that contract nor bound by the resulting
award. Following a three-day hearing, the court of first instance in July 2008 set
aside the preliminary enforcement order, relying on Article V(1)(a) of the New
York Convention and the corresponding UK statutory provision.5 The English
Court of Appeal, upon hearing, dismissed Dallah’s appeal in July 2009. This
appeal to the UK Supreme Court followed.
III. THE STATE AS NON-SIGNATORY OF THE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The single overriding issue of substance in Dallah was whether the
Government of Pakistan was bound by an arbitration agreement entered into
between one of its instrumentalities and a private party. The question is anything
but new,6 and it will not fade any time soon, if only because the analysis required
to answer the question is ordinarily highly fact-intensive and circumstancespecific. Neither before tribunals nor courts does any single factor seem to
dominate the analysis. Results have tended to turn on what may be called the
“totality of the circumstances,” an approach that entails identifying and weighing
what can be a long list of indicators of the separateness, or lack thereof, of the two
entities in question. The exercise is burdened not only with sprawling sets of
5
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disparate facts, but also with an abundance of legal theories through the lens of
which those facts are commonly viewed: estoppel, agency, alter ego, assignment,
third-party beneficiary, and still others.
Cases of this sort predictably abound. But Dallah will assume a leading place
among them, and this for several reasons, quite apart from the sheer fact that it
finds the UK Supreme Court denying enforcement of a French award under
French law, and the French Cour d’appel subsequently rejecting that analysis.
First, by its decision, the Court has lent currency to the French law notion that the
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards, and international
arbitration law generally, is governed by “transnational” principles, rather than the
law of any particular jurisdiction. Second, the Court found in that body of
transnational law a guiding principle that, if followed, stands to alter considerably
the outcome of cases that, like Dallah, turn on whether agreements to arbitrate
entered into by an instrumentality of the State bind the State itself.
The arbitral tribunal in Dallah had itself applied transnational principles to the
jurisdictional question, on the ground that French law – the law of the arbitral
situs – so required. Citing the international character of the arbitration agreement,
the parties’ selection of the ICC as arbitral institution, and the absence of any
reference in the agreement to the arbitration law of any particular country, the
tribunal characterized the arbitration as truly international, and therefore subject
through French law to “those transnational general principles and usages
reflecting the fundamental requirements of justice in international trade and the
concept of good faith in business.”7 Those principles, the arbitral tribunal found,
permitted a non-signatory to be bound by an arbitration agreement “by virtue of
any one of a number of legal theories such as representation, assignment,
succession, alter ego or the theory of group of companies.”8 To determine
whether any of these theories would bind the Government of Pakistan to the
arbitration agreement, the tribunal conducted what it termed “a close scrutiny of
the conduct and of the actions of the parties before, during and after the
implementation of the main Agreement,”9 concluding on that basis that the Trust
and the Government were essentially alter egos. The Government was accordingly
bound by the contract between Dallah and the Trust, including its arbitration
clause.
While an arbitral tribunal of course has a voice in the matter, so too do courts,
both before the arbitration (in determining whether the State may be compelled to
arbitrate) and afterwards (in entertaining either a challenge to the award or a
defense against recognition or enforcement). As noted, the English courts, both at
first instance and on appeal, denied Dallah’s petition for enforcement of the
award, invoking Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention and the UK
implementing legislation, which permits a court to deny enforcement if the
7

Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 33.
Id. at ¶ 34.
9
Id. at ¶ 36. The tribunal thus drew upon the factual circumstances surrounding the
arbitration agreement’s “negotiation, performance and termination.” Id.
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resisting party proves that the agreement to arbitrate “is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the
law of the country where the award was made.”
On further appeal, the UK Supreme Court conducted a conventional choiceof-law analysis, taking as its point of departure Article V(1)(a)’s reference to “the
law to which the parties have subjected [the arbitration agreement] or, failing any
indication thereon, . . . the law of the country where the award was made.” The
applicable law was, uncontroversially, French law. Like the arbitral tribunal
itself, the Court concluded that the French law of international arbitration
incorporated transnational principles.10 It explained at some length that, in
applying those principles, it was applying nothing other than French law.11
However, Lord Mance found fault with the tribunal’s understanding of the
relevant transnational principles under French case law. In his understanding,
those principles permitted a non-signatory to be bound by an arbitration
agreement only if it was the “common intention” of the parties that it be bound.12
Although the tribunal, like the French law experts on both sides, had alluded to
the common intention of the parties, its analysis, in Lord Mance’s opinion,
appeared largely to be driven by factors more closely relevant to alter ego
doctrine. Lord Mance discerned a substantial divide between alter ego analysis
and the search for the parties’ common intention:
There is a considerable difference between a finding . . . that one of two
contracting parties is the alter ego of a third person and a finding that it was the
common intention of the other party to the contract that the third person should
be a party to the contract made with the first party. The former depends on the
characteristics and relationship of the first contracting party and the third person.
The latter depends on a common intention on the part of the second contracting
party and the third person . . .13

10

Lord Collins cited, among others, the following French judgments for this
proposition: Municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v. Dalico, 1994 REV. ARB. 116 (Cour de
Cassation, Dec. 20, 1993); Hecht v. Buisman’s, 1974 REV. CRIT. 82 (Cour de Cassation,
July 4, 1972); Menicucci v. Mahieux, 1976 REV. CRIT. 507 (Ct. App., Dec. 13, 1975).
11
According to Lord Collins, “The fact that the experts were agreed that an arbitral
tribunal with a French seat may apply transnational law or transnational rules to the
validity of an arbitration agreement does not mean that a French court would not be
applying French law . . .” Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 115.
12
The Court cited both the doctrinal writings of scholars and French case law,
including Municipalité de Khoms El Mergeb v. Dalico, supra note 10; Société IsoverSaint-Gobain v. Société Dow Chemical, 1984 REV. ARB. 98 (Ct. App., Oct. 21, 1983);
Compagnie tunisienne de Navigation v. Société Comptoir commercial André, 1990 REV.
ARB. 675 (Ct. App., Nov. 28, 1989); Orri v. Société des Lubrifiants Elf Aquitaine, 1992
JUR. FR. 95 (Ct. App., Jan. 11, 1990).
13
Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 39.
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In Lord Mance’s view, the tribunal erred by focusing unduly on the Government’s
involvement in the negotiation and performance of the contract between Dallah
and the Trust. That focus had led the tribunal to dwell on factual aspects of the
relationship between the Government and the Trust, as if they were the only
relevant parties, thereby leaving Dallah’s intentions out of the equation. Lord
Collins took a similar view, rejecting the notion that the Government’s control
over the Trust (even if considerable) and its direct involvement in the
implementation of the contract (even if likewise considerable) evidenced the
Government’s intention to be bound by the arbitration agreement.14
The Court thus ended up purporting to assess the existence and validity of the
arbitration agreement under the transnational principles that French courts had
announced as being part of French law. Although those standards deviated from
those found in English law,15 the New York Convention and its UK implementing
legislation mandated their application. The Court must itself have thought this an
important statement to make, since it devoted pages to the issue of the applicable
law, even though it does not seem to have been a point of major contention
between the parties or between their French law experts, who agreed both that
French law incorporated transnational principles and that the relevant test under
those principles was the “common intention” of the parties.16 The Court expressly
rejected on this point the position taken by the UK judge at first instance that
14

Id. at ¶¶ 141-42.
Lord Mance obviously considered the common intention test derived from
transnational law to be extremely relaxed by UK standards. “This then,” he said “is the
test which must be satisfied before the French court will conclude that a third person is an
unnamed party to an international arbitration agreement. It is difficult to conceive that any
more relaxed test would be consistent with justice and reasonable commercial
expectations, however international the arbitration or transnational the principles
applied” (emphasis added). Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 18.
16
The experts’ joint memorandum concluded, with regard to the transnational
character of French law on the subject:
Under French law, the existence, validity and effectiveness of an arbitration
agreement in an international arbitration . . . need not be assessed on the basis
of a national law, be it the law applicable to the main contract or any other law,
and can be determined according to rules of transnational law.
Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.
Their joint memorandum showed further agreement on the content of the relevant
transnational law principles:
Under French law, in order to determine whether an arbitration clause upon
which the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is founded extends to a person who
is neither a named party nor a signatory to the underlying agreement containing
that clause, it is necessary to find out whether all the parties to the arbitration
proceedings, including that person, had the common intention (whether express
or implied) to be bound by the said agreement and, as a result, by the
arbitration clause therein. The existence of a common intention of the parties is
determined in the light of the facts of the case.
Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 17.
15
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transnational law is not part of French law, but external to it, and that the New
York Convention and its UK implementing legislation contemplate application of
the internal law of the place where the award was made, not its conflict of laws
rules.17
The Court’s focus on the “common intention” of the parties as the operative
principle of French law, rather than more objective-sounding tests like alter ego, is
of course not without significance. An approach based on the parties’ common
intentions tends to shift attention away from factual aspects of the relationship
between what may appear to be alter egos, including the State’s sometimes very
compromising conduct vis-à-vis the instrumentality over the life of the contract,
and toward more direct evidence of party intention. In a more intention-driven
inquiry of that kind, the structure and content of the underlying transaction
necessarily loom large, as they tend to speak directly to what the parties intended
to achieve. Lord Mance put the matter bluntly:
The tribunal’s test represents, on its face, a low threshold which, if correct, would
raise a presumption that many third persons were party to contracts deliberately
structured so that they were not party.18

Lord Mance then reviewed the record in some detail through the lens of common
intention, as he understood that notion, and found the tribunal’s conclusion that
the Government was bound to be simply “unpersuasive.”
The upshot is that the course of events does not justify a conclusion that it was
Dallah’s and the Government’s common intention or belief that the Government
should be or was a party to the Agreement, when the Agreement was deliberately
structured to be, and was agreed, between Dallah and the Trust.19
17

Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 15. Lord Collins acknowledged that the New York
Convention, in signaling the law applicable to a particular ground for denying
enforcement, meant the internal law of that jurisdiction and not its conflict of laws rules.
He considered it likely that the Convention thus meant to exclude renvoi. But he rightly
insisted that, when French courts apply transnational principles to international arbitration
cases, they directly apply substantive French law. Id. at ¶¶ 124-25.
18
Id. at ¶ 40 (emphasis added).
19
Id. at ¶ 66 (emphasis added). Counsel for Dallah also argued that the use of the
word “may” in Article V of the Convention gave the UK courts discretion to enforce a
foreign award even in the presence of a ground that would justify a refusal to enforce.
Lord Mance acknowledged that the word “may” rendered denial of enforcement in
general terms discretionary with the courts. However, he found it unthinkable that an
award not based on any agreement to arbitrate at all could possibly warrant enforcement.
“Absent some fresh circumstance such as another agreement or an estoppel, it would be a
remarkable state of affairs if the word ‘may’ enabled a court to enforce or recognize an
award which it found to have been made without jurisdiction, under whatever law it held
ought to be recognized and applied to determine that issue.” Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 69.
The case of Dardana Ltd. v. Yukos Oil Co., [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 326 (¶ 8) is an example
of a court finding a “fresh circumstance,” in the form of an “estoppel,” sufficient to justify
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On the contrary, the parties’ common intention was that the Government not be
bound. The structure and content of the contract figure prominently in Lord
Collins’ opinion as well:
[T]here was no material sufficient to justify the tribunal’s conclusion that the
Government’s behaviour showed and proved that the Government had always
been, and considered itself to be, a true party to the Agreement and therefore to
the Arbitration Agreement. On the contrary, all of the material up to and
including the termination letter shows that the common intention was that the
parties were to be Dallah and the Trust. On the face of the Agreement the parties
and the signatories were Dallah and the Trust. The Government’s role was as
guarantor and beneficiary of a counter-guarantee. The assignment clause showed
that the Government was not a party. It permitted the Trust to assign or transfer
its rights and obligations under the Agreement to the Government without the
prior consent in writing of Dallah. The arbitration clause related to any dispute
between the Trust and Dallah.20

The factors to which Lord Collins attached the greatest weight were ones
inscribed in the contract as such, either in its structure or its content.
Under the Court’s understanding of common intention in French law, if a
party is put clearly enough on notice from the start that a State wants to be
regarded as not a party to a transaction, it will have difficulty establishing that
either it or the State (or the instrumentality, for that matter) shared a common
intention that the State be bound. Notwithstanding the Court’s insistence that the
subjective intention can only be gleaned from the objective conduct of the
parties,21 the inquiry remains a fundamentally subjective one, certainly by
comparison with such highly objectivized tests as alter ego. There is of course a
certain irony in all of this. The Court applied French transnational law principles,
which are commonly thought of as relaxing the standards for binding nonsignatories to a contract, but read them in a way that would actually impede
finding the State bound.
In the wake of the UK Supreme Court’s decision, it could reasonably be asked
what influence that ruling should have on the then ongoing proceedings in France,
home of the award. Lord Mance and Lord Collins properly observed that whether
the award is valid and enforceable in France is a question that only a French court
can answer. But, as Lord Mance noted, “an English judgment holding that the
award is not valid could prove significant in relation to such proceedings.”22 Both
judges raised the possibility that a French court might give issue preclusive effect
to the UK judgment on the issue of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement
enforcing an award that could have been denied enforcement under Article V(1)(a) of the
Convention. Lord Collins agreed. Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 127.
20
Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 145 (emphasis added).
21
Lord Collins put it this way: “The common intention of the parties means their
subjective intention derived from the objective evidence.” Id. at ¶ 122.
22
Id. at ¶ 29.
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but, as Lord Mance rightly observed, whether a UK judgment on a French award
is entitled to preclusive or even persuasive effect in a French court is likewise for
the French court itself to determine.23 Most likely, French courts, not generally
embracing the practice of issue preclusion, would decide the matter de novo, or at
least purport to do so.
The subsequent decision of the Cour d’appel of Paris in Dallah supports that
assumption and also shows how outcome-determinative a court’s approach to the
jurisdictional issue can be. In that decision,24 the Cour d’appel upheld the award
against the very same challenge that had defeated enforcement in the UK Supreme
Court. The Cour d’appel found that the Government of Pakistan had been
Dallah’s sole interlocutor in the negotiation of the contract, and that the decision
to enter into the contract with Dallah was made by the Board of Trustrees of the
Trust at a meeting presided over by the Minister of Religious Affairs, even though
the latter was not a member of the Board. It further found that, following the
contract, Ministry officials intervened directly in financial and public relations
aspects of the project, and that the declaration that Dallah had committed a
fundamental breach of the contract, justifying its rescission, was made on Ministry
letterhead. On these bases, the French court found that the Government of
Pakistan “acted as if the contract were its own” and “as … the veritable Pakistani
party.” In so doing, the court quite evidently relied in substantial measure on
conduct following the entry into force of the contract, as is customary in the
context of alter ego analyses. It said relatively little about what appeared to have
mattered most to the UK Supreme Court, namely the common intention of the
parties as manifested by the language and structure of the contract itself and the
circumstances under which it was formed.
Judging by the decision of the Cour d’appel, the UK Supreme Court failed in
its understanding of the French law governing an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction
over a non-signatory. Was the UK Supreme Court misled by the expert witnesses
who appeared before it? Did the Court invoke the proper French law standard –
namely, the common intention of the parties – but misapply it? Did the Court,
while purporting to apply French law, actually come closer to applying English
law principles or possibly, even unconsciously, effectuate its own policy
preferences on the jurisdictional issue? Or did the Court possibly understand and
apply French law more accurately than the Cour d’appel itself would later do?
These questions cannot be answered with any confidence. But what can be said
with confidence is that the divergence between the UK and French courts on the
jurisdictional issue in Dallah could have been avoided if the UK court had availed
itself of the discretion given it by Article VI of the New York Convention to stay
the UK enforcement proceedings until such time as the annulment action in
23

The question whether award recognition encompasses issue preclusion as well as
claim preclusion is a delicate one. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE U.S. LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Council Draft No. 2, Sept. 27, 2010,
approved Oct. 21, 2010. § 5-3(e), comment i, and reporters’ note i.
24
See note 4 supra.
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France had run its course. That would have permitted the jurisdictional issue to be
decided by the court of the place of arbitration and of the State whose law by all
accounts governed that issue.
The divergence will undoubtedly complicate further attempts, if any, at
enforcement of the award outside of France. There is of course no possibility of
the award coming again before the UK courts and of those courts, in reliance on
the Cour d’appel ruling, reaching a different conclusion than the UK Supreme
Court has now reached. In the UK at least, the matter is res judicata. But,
suppose enforcement is subsequently sought elsewhere outside of France. The
UK Supreme Court decision would ordinarily have considerable influence when
the Government of Pakistan raises the jurisdictional issue to defeat enforcement in
the third country’s court, as surely it would. But assuming the Cour d’appel
decision is not reversed by the Cour de Cassation, it would likely carry even
greater weight in that third country, given that French law governs the
jurisdictional issue, and that French courts may be deemed to know that law best.
With international arbitral awards coming with greater frequency before the courts
of different States in succession, the prospect grows that they will be accorded
respect in some States but not others, thereby offering States before which the
award is yet to come an embarrassment of choice.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF ENFORCEMENT
While the UK Supreme Court ruling in Dallah principally addresses a matter
of substance – the effectiveness of a State’s efforts to distance itself from contracts
of its instrumentalities and from the arbitrations to which they give rise – it also
casts light more generally on the judicial role in assessing the existence and
validity of an arbitration agreement in the context of actions to enforce a foreign
award. That role is immensely complicated by the fact just alluded to that the
same issues – some of them, like the existence and validity of the arbitration
agreement, very fundamental – may in a single case be revisited successively by
different actors in different jurisdictions.
Dallah illustrates well the number and range of decisional bodies that may
find themselves facing the same basic questions of arbitral authority. At one point
in the Dallah case, the Pakistani courts were asked to decide whether a valid
agreement to arbitrate existed between Dallah and the Government; they rightly
understood that their own jurisdiction to decide the underlying dispute on the
merits would depend on that. When the case then went to arbitration, the same
question was laid squarely before the arbitral tribunal. The question next came in
for examination in the English courts at all levels in the enforcement context. As
we know, the case came before the French courts as well in the form of both an
action to enforce the award and an action to annul it. Theoretically, each of these
judicial and arbitral bodies could examine the question of the existence and
validity of the arbitration agreement de novo, but they could equally well decide
to show deference to a prior determination of the issue. As noted, they could

2011]

THE UK SUPREME COURT: LEARNING FROM THE DALLAH CASE

11

conceivably, but improbably, even regard a certain prior determination as
conclusive of that matter.
Despite the fact that this revisiting of issues is entirely endemic to arbitration,
the problems it raises are still not well settled in either the law or the literature, as
further evidenced by the attention they are receiving in the current Restatement of
the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration.25 But the Dallah opinions
contribute importantly to their better understanding.
Counsel for Dallah had formulated two propositions in this regard, both of
which would tend to favor enforcement of the award: one, the claim that courts of
enforcement have a lesser role to play than courts of the place of arbitration in
determining the existence and validity of the agreement to arbitrate; the other, the
claim that courts of enforcement in any event owe deference on those questions to
the conclusions that the arbitral tribunal reached in establishing its own competence.
A. Ancillary Issues
Before turning to these core questions, I draw the reader’s attention to three
ancillary issues on which the UK Supreme Court in Dallah took positions worth
mentioning. Though all three of these issues – (1) the status under the Convention
of a partial award; (2) estoppel based on a failure to seek annulment of an award;
and (3) the impact of a parallel annulment action in the arbitral situs – pertain to
the recognition and enforcement of awards, they are incidental to the central
jurisdictional question, and I discuss them only briefly.
1. Partial Awards
Counsel for Dallah made the assertion in oral argument that the first partial
award, in which the tribunal found in favor of its jurisdiction, was itself an award
entitled to recognition and enforcement.26 Even if that were so, it would logically
have no bearing on the analysis or the result, since the first partial award was no
different from the final award insofar as it was based on the same agreement to
arbitrate to which the Government claimed it was not a party. However, instead
of dismissing Dallah’s argument on that basis, Lord Mance took the position that
partial awards are simply not awards within the meaning of the New York
Convention and are not properly the subject of an action for enforcement.27 That
25

RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 5-5 (Council Draft No. 2, Sept. 27, 2010, approved Oct. 21, 2010).
26
The argument apparently was that the first partial award was made on proper
jurisdiction because, under kompetenz-kompetenz, arbitral tribunals necessarily have the
authority to rule on their own jurisdiction – even if they cannot validly rule on the merits
once it is determined that they lack jurisdiction. And the first partial award is as such
entitled to recognition and enforcement, thus disposing definitively of the jurisdictional
question. See Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 99.
27
“First, (in the absence of any agreement to submit the question of arbitrability itself
to arbitration) I do not regard the New York Convention as concerned with preliminary
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conclusion is not, however, self-evident. To begin with, neither the Convention
nor its legislative history gives any indication one way or the other as to whether
partial awards are to be treated any differently than final awards. Certainly, from
a policy point of view, subjecting partial awards to the Convention produces
advantages in terms of enforcement. In fact, denying Convention status to partial
awards fits poorly with the notion that they dispose in a final and binding fashion
of the matters resolved therein. The matter is one worthy of fuller consideration
than Lord Mance, in passing, gave it.28 If partial awards are ultimately found to
constitute awards within the meaning of the New York Convention, further and
more technical questions then arise, not least the time when the statute of
limitations applicable to actions to set them aside starts to run.
2.

Estoppel for Failure to Seek Annulment

The UK Court was on more solid footing in rejecting counsel’s assertion that
a party may not invoke a ground for denying enforcement of an award if it could
have sought annulment of the award in a court of the arbitral situs on that basis,
but failed to do so. Counsel for Dallah had in effect posited an exhaustion of
remedies requirement that would make a party’s failure to seek annulment of an
award on a given ground a bar to its assertion as a defense to enforcement. Lord
Mance correctly viewed the argument as logically flawed:
A person who denies being party to any relevant arbitration agreement has no
obligation to participate in the arbitration or to take any steps in the country of
the seat of what he maintains to be an invalid arbitration leading to an invalid
award against him. The party initiating the arbitration must try to enforce the
award where it can. Only then and there is it incumbent on the defendant
denying the existence of any valid award to resist enforcement.29

awards on jurisdiction.” Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 22, citing FOUCHARD, GAILLARD &
GOLDMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 654 (Emmanuel Gaillard &
John Savage eds., 1999).
28
The Restatement Third of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration
opts for treating partial awards in the same fashion as any other award for recognition and
enforcement purposes. Indeed it goes much further, defining awards within the meaning
of the Convention to include even arbitral orders of provisional relief, though not purely
procedural orders. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, § 1-1(v) (Council Draft No. 2, Sept. 27, 2010, approved
Oct. 21, 2010).
29
Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 23. However, Lord Mance allowed for the possibility
that the parties might agree in advance to submit the issue of arbitral jurisdiction itself to
the arbitral tribunal, provided they do so clearly and unmistakably, citing First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). However, “[a]n arbitral tribunal’s
decision as to the existence of its own jurisdiction cannot therefore bind a party who has
not submitted the question of arbitrability to the tribunal.” Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 26.
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More important, the position urged by counsel would serve only to foment
litigation, as parties would understandably feel it necessary to bring annulment
actions if only to preserve all colorable objections for use in defeating a later
enforcement action. The case did not require the Court to go any further in this
path of reasoning. When the occasion arises, however, courts would do well to
take the position that even though a party is not positively bound to bring an
annulment action in the arbitral situs in order to defeat enforcement of an award
elsewhere, it is required to advance all available arguments in any annulment
action it chooses to bring, or be deemed to have waived them at the enforcement
stage. Such a position would promote judicial economy without inciting parties to
bring unnecessary litigation.30
3. Parallel Annulment Proceedings
The New York Convention permits a court in which enforcement of a foreign
award is sought to suspend proceedings on the matter if an action to set aside the
award is at that time pending in a competent court of the place of arbitration.
Commonly, by the time enforcement has been sought in a foreign jurisdiction, the
action to set aside the award will already have been brought. The stage is thus set
for the foreign court to exercise its discretion to stay enforcement proceedings.
Dallah played out differently. The tribunal rendered its final award in June
2006, and the UK enforcement action was brought a few months later, in October
2006. Yet the Government did not seek set aside of the award in France until
December 2009, doing so in apparent response to Dallah’s having applied for
enforcement of the award in France in August of that year. (Under French law,
the annulment action was still timely.) Thus, even if the lower UK courts would
have wanted to stay proceedings until a set aside action in France was decided,
they could not do so. The Convention clearly requires that a set aside action have
already been instituted; it is not enough that such an action would still be timely.
Why the Government refrained so long from challenging the award in France is a
matter of surmise.
By the time the French enforcement and set aside actions were initiated, the
UK litigation had progressed rather far. The English Court of Appeal, following
the court of first instance, had already refused enforcement of the award. Dallah’s
lack of success in the English courts doubtless led it to turn then to France for
enforcement of the award. By this time, the prospects for enforcement of the
award in the UK had dimmed to the point that Dallah petitioned the UK Supreme
Court, unsuccessfully we know, to stay proceedings until such time as the French
set aside action had been decided.

30

See, to this effect, RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 5-17(c)(Council Draft No. 2, Sept. 27, 2010, approved Oct.
21, 2010).
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B. Levels of Inquiry and Deference
I turn now to the two principal systemic questions that confronted the UK
Supreme Court in Dallah. First, how, if at all, does the nature of the review that
an award receives in an annulment action in the arbitral situs differ from its review
in an action for the award’s enforcement abroad? Second, what weight, if any,
should the court where enforcement is sought give to arbitral findings on issues,
such as the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement, on which the grant
or denial of enforcement may depend?
1. Levels of Jurisdictional Review
Counsel for Dallah urged the UK Supreme Court to distinguish between the
courts of the place of arbitration, on the one hand, and the courts where an award
is brought for enforcement, on the other, in terms of their level of scrutiny of the
existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. According to the submission,
while a French court would properly determine de novo whether an arbitration
agreement existed between Dallah and the Government, the English courts
properly exercise a more relaxed standard of review, i.e. one reflecting a measure
of deference to the arbitral tribunal’s findings on that matter.31 Put differently, the
enforcement jurisdiction owes the tribunal’s determination a degree of respect; the
courts of the place where the award was made do not.32
It is true that the arbitration literature draws a distinction between courts
having primary and those having secondary jurisdiction over awards.33 Primary
jurisdiction – which belongs to the jurisdiction on whose territory or under whose
31

Lord Mance put the contention of Dallah’s counsel as follows:
In [her] submission, any enforcing court (other than the court of the seat of
arbitration) . . . should do no more than “review” the tribunal’s jurisdiction and
the precedent question whether there was ever any arbitration agreement
binding on the Government. The nature of the suggested review should be
“flexible and nuanced” according to the circumstances. . . . [She] argues . . . in
favour of a limited review. . . . [A] court should refuse to become further
involved, at least when the tribunal’s conclusions could be regarded on their
face as plausible or “reasonably supportable.”
Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 21.
32
It was apparently argued to the Court that the inclusion of Article V(1)(e) in the
New York Convention permitting a court to deny enforcement of an award that has been
set aside in a competent court of the place of arbitration implied that the latter court has
greater responsibility for determining arbitral jurisdiction than courts to which the award
may be brought for enforcement. That argument is wide of the mark. All that Article
V(1)(e) does is reserve the right of annulment to courts of the place of arbitration. It does
not address the proper level of review in a completely independent ground for denying
enforcement, such as Article V(1)(a).
33
See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2403 ff.
(2009).
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law of arbitration an award was made – entails certain prerogatives. The State of
primary jurisdiction is not only the one whose law of arbitration presumptively
governs the arbitral proceedings; it is also the one whose courts intervene in the
arbitration when necessary (as in hearing challenges to an arbitrator or issuing or
enforcing an award of interim relief); and most importantly, it is the one, and only
one, whose courts may set aside the award, doing so under their own annulment
standards. Courts having secondary jurisdiction perform fewer functions. They
are basically limited to enforcing or denying enforcement of the award, ordinarily
under the standards set out in the New York Convention. On these propositions
there is general agreement.
In fact, however, courts of both primary and secondary jurisdiction are often
called upon to answer the same questions: was the agreement that formed the basis
of the arbitration actually formed? was it valid? may it be considered as binding
on the party challenging the award? The consequences of finding the arbitration
agreement non-existent or invalid admittedly differ according to the court making
that pronouncement: the court of primary jurisdiction may on that ground annul
the award, while a court of secondary jurisdiction can do no more than decline to
enforce it. But the question to be addressed is substantively the same.
The novel aspect of Dallah’s argument in this regard was its suggestion that
the level of judicial scrutiny applied to those questions should differ depending on
whether the court in question has primary or secondary jurisdiction over the
award. Under the thesis advanced by Dallah, the court of primary jurisdiction
performs a more searching review than the court of secondary jurisdiction,
presumably because it has greater responsibility for ensuring the legitimacy of the
award and the party’s consent to be bound by it. If that thesis were to be applied
in Dallah, a French court could determine the jurisdictional matter de novo, while
a UK court would need to show deference to the tribunal.
The UK Supreme Court rejected this thesis, and properly so. Neither Lord
Mance nor Lord Collins could find any evidence in the Convention to support the
notion that an enforcing court should exercise less than fully independent
judgment on the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Neither could
they find any support in the arbitration case law or literature; all authority pointed
to the contrary. For Lord Mance, it was plain that arbitrators cannot by their own
decision create arbitral authority.34 For Lord Collins, the very point of Article
34

Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 24. Lord Mance allowed that the parties could expressly
grant the tribunal power to decide whether the arbitration agreement exists and is valid,
though they would have to do so in a clear and unmistakable fashion. This does not seem
correct. The parties could, and sometimes do, expressly give the tribunal the power to
determine the scope of disputes subject to arbitration, but at least in that case they concede
that an arbitration agreement exists and that it binds them. But if a party contends that
there was no arbitration agreement at all, it is difficult to base jurisdiction on that
agreement. He is correct on the main point, however. As he points out, “The tribunal’s
own view of its jurisdiction has no legal or evidential value, when the issue is whether the
tribunal had any legitimate authority in relation to the Government at all.” Id. at ¶ 30.
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V(1)(a) is that it “safeguards . . . the right of a party which has not agreed to
arbitration to object to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.”35
In further support of the Court’s position, suppose the party prevailing in the
arbitration does not seek enforcement in the place of arbitration. It certainly is not
required to do so; on the contrary, one of the accomplishments of the New York
Convention was precisely to eliminate the so-called requirement of “double
exequatur.”36 Therefore, unless the losing party invokes that court’s jurisdiction
to have the award set aside, that court will make no exercise of primary
jurisdiction over the award. But for its part, neither is the losing party obliged to
seek annulment of the award in the court of primary jurisdiction as a precondition
to resisting enforcement at a later date in a court of secondary jurisdiction.37
Therefore, in the entirely plausible event that neither party invokes the jurisdiction
of a court of the place where the award was made, judicial review of the award on
issues as important as the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement may
be had only in courts of secondary jurisdiction on the occasion of an application
for the award’s enforcement. No other court will conduct independent post-award
review of those issues. And there may well have been no pre-award judicial
determination of those issues either, certainly not in France. In France, and in
jurisdictions following French law on the issue, a case goes to arbitration in the
first place on a mere prima facie showing of jurisdiction. A party resisting
arbitration at that stage must show that an agreement to arbitrate manifestly does
not exist or is manifestly invalid.38 Indeed, the very justification given in France
for tolerating so relaxed a standard of inquiry at the threshold of the proceedings
is that the courts where enforcement of the resulting award is sought can be
counted on to make an independent judgment on the existence and validity of the
arbitration agreement if the party resisting enforcement so requests.39
Moreover, had the Supreme Court accepted Dallah’s thesis, it would soon
enough be asked to define the parameters of the relaxed standard of review to
which a court of secondary jurisdiction was to be confined. Courts do of course
sometimes assume the task of delineating levels of scrutiny in judicial review, but
35

Id. at ¶ 102.
As Lord Collins observed, “There is nothing in the Convention which imposes an
obligation on a party seeking to resist an award on the ground of the non-existence of an
arbitration agreement to challenge the award before the courts of the seat.” Id. at ¶ 103.
See also id. at ¶ 131.
37
See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
38
The new French decree on international arbitration codifies the prior case law to
this effect. Decree No. 2011-48 of Jan. 13, 2011 (J.O. Jan. 14, 2011, p. 9). According to
Article 1447 of the Code of Civil Procedure, introduced by the decree, “[t]he arbitral
tribunal has exclusive authority to rule on objections to its authority.” Article 1448 adds
that “[w]hen a dispute subject to an arbitration agreement is brought before a court, such
court shall decline jurisdiction except if an arbitral tribunal has not yet been vested to hear
the dispute and if the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or manifestly not
applicable.”
39
See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at ¶ 654.
36
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they tend to do so when the substantive issues at stake – such as the protection of
fundamental rights – justify the burden of doing so. But counsel was inviting the
Court in Dallah to establish a two-tier regime across the international arbitration
board. The Court did well to decline the invitation.40
2. Deference to the Arbitrators
Counsel for Dallah also took an alternate route to the same result by positing a
general requirement of deference to the arbitral tribunal’s determination of its own
jurisdiction, invoking the notion of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Counsel buttressed
its argument with a claim that the tribunal in the Dallah case was an especially
eminent one whose jurisdictional determination was therefore especially deserving
of respect.
Both Lord Mance and Lord Collins decisively rejected this submission as
well, and rightly so. There are numerous reasons for allowing courts to freely
reexamine the tribunal’s finding that a valid arbitration agreement existed. It is
widely suspected, and most likely true, that arbitral tribunals have a built-in bias
in favor of finding that they have, rather than lack, jurisdiction. But even putting
aside that unproven assertion, the fact remains that a question as fundamental as
jurisdiction should not be left primarily in the hands of the body whose authority
to decide it rests on that very agreement. Or, as Lord Saville, concurring in
Dallah, put it:
[T]o take as the starting point the ruling made by the arbitrators and to give that
ruling some special status is to beg the question at issue, for this approach
necessarily assumes that the parties have, to some extent at least, agreed that the
arbitrators have power to make a binding ruling that affects their rights and
obligation; for without some such agreement such a ruling cannot have any status
at all.41

In any event, the case for deferring to the arbitrators on the matter of arbitral
jurisdiction would apply equally well to the court of the place of arbitration as to
courts where enforcement is sought. Were it extended to those courts as well, we
would arrive once again at the result that no court – neither the court of annulment
nor the court of enforcement – is entitled on a post-award basis to pass
independent judgment on the tribunal’s assertion of authority if challenged. One
should hesitate long before endorsing such a result.

40

Lord Mance looked unfavorably on the prospect that the same issue would be
subject to levels of review that vary according to the court in which it raised. Dallah,
supra note 3, at ¶ 27.
41
Id. at ¶ 159. Lord Saville continued: “[A]n arbitral tribunal may rule on its own
jurisdiction but cannot be the final arbiter of jurisdiction, ‘for this would provide a classic
case of pulling oneself up by one’s own bootstraps’” (quoting from the 1996 Report on
the Arbitration Bill by the Departmental Advisory Committee).
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Alternatively, one might say that arbitral findings on a question like the
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, while not presumed to be
correct, are entitled to at least some weight. Lord Mance decisively rejected that
position as well,42 though he allowed that a court may “examine, both carefully
and with interest, the reasoning and conclusion of an arbitral tribunal which has
undertaken a similar examination.”43 Drawing the line between giving some
weight to a finding, on the one hand, and examining it “with interest,” on the
other, is a delicate exercise indeed.44
Counsel for Dallah also invoked the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz to
support its assertion that jurisdictional findings by arbitral tribunals deserve
deference at the award enforcement stage. In fact, views differ considerably on
exactly what the notion of Kompetenz-Kompetenz entails and how it is to be
operationalized. Even its most ardent adherents present it as only guaranteeing to
a tribunal the right to make an initial determination of its own jurisdiction, a
determination that will be subject to de novo post-award judicial review.45 In any
event, views differ on whether a tribunal’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz is exclusive.
Thus, does Kompetenz-Kompetenz have not only a “positive” dimension
(enabling the tribunal to determine initially its own jurisdiction), but also a
“negative” one (barring courts from addressing the issue of arbitral jurisdiction
issue before the tribunal has an opportunity to do so)? Though many in the
arbitral community regard “positive” Kompetenz-Kompetenz as meaningless
unless accompanied by “negative” Kompetenz-Kompetenz,46 others disagree.47
42

“The tribunal’s own view of its jurisdiction has no legal or evidential value, when
the issue is whether the tribunal had any legitimate authority in relation to the Government
at all.” Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 30.
43
Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. According to Lord Mance, “Courts welcome useful assistance.”
44
The Restatement strikes a similar note, while allowing for the rare possibility that
jurisdiction might turn on conflicting testimony of live witnesses, whose credibility
matters. RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (Council Draft No. 2, Sept. 27, 2010, approved Oct. 21, 2010).
45
See China Minmetals Materials Import & Export Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334
F.3d 274, 288 (3d Cir. 2003).
46
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 27, at ¶¶ 655, 672. Under this
view, a court may not intervene on issues of arbitral jurisdiction prior to the tribunal’s
having the opportunity to rule on it, unless the tribunal is “manifestly” without
jurisdiction.
47
See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial
Arbitration, forthcoming in 37 YALE J. INT’L L. __ (2011). This is the view suggested by
Lord Collins in his opinion in Dallah:
[T]he principle that a tribunal in an international commercial arbitration has the
power to consider its own jurisdiction is no doubt a general principle of law. . .
But it does not follow that the tribunal has the exclusive power to determine its
own jurisdiction, nor does it follow that the court of the seat may not determine
whether the tribunal has jurisdiction before the tribunal has ruled on it.
Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 84 (emphasis added). Lord Collins continued: “The constant
practice of the courts in England has been that they will examine or re-examine for
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This is not the place to reopen that debate. But the Dallah case itself has at least
something to say about the wisdom of postponing to the post-award stage the first
serious judicial inquiry into the binding effect of the arbitration agreement on the
foreign State. It is true that a refusal by the UK courts to enforce an award, even
on the basis of Article V(1)(a), does not affect the award’s validity in France or
elsewhere. If the award ends up being enforced in another jurisdiction, the
resources invested in the arbitration will not have been wasted. But they could be
wasted if a French court were to have come to the same conclusion that the UK
courts did and if other enforcement fora were to accord the French court
determination substantial weight, as well they might.
Finally, the Supreme Court knew well enough not to credit any argument that
the degree of respect that a court shows to a tribunal’s jurisdictional findings
should vary according to the court’s assessment of the eminence of its members.
It is difficult to imagine a more mischievous path of analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
In Dallah, the UK Supreme Court rendered a decision that matters greatly to
international commercial arbitration on several levels. From a conflict of laws
point of view, the Court was drawn to applying to the jurisdictional question a
“transnational” body of law the genesis of which lay in French law notions of the
autonomy of the arbitration agreement – notions quite alien to the common-law
tradition. To be sure, the Supreme Court did not itself discover the “common
intention” test in the French “transnational” law relevant to determining the
separateness of the State from its instrumentalities in the arbitration context; the
French law experts had jointly directed the Court to it. Still, the Court had no
hesitation in acknowledging that French law governed the jurisdictional issue and
in those terms.
On the other hand, the Court, while by all appearances making a serious
inquiry into the relevant French law, may well have deviated from it. It certainly
accorded greater weight to the structure and content of the agreement itself than to
patterns of control by the State over the instrumentality throughout the contract
period. That makes sense if the goal of the inquiry is to ascertain what the parties
subjectively intended. But while the UK court may well have captured the parties’
common intentions, it also incentivizes States to interpose state instrumentalities
themselves the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. This can arise in a variety of contexts,
including a challenge to the tribunal’s jurisdiction under Section 67 of the 1996 Act, or in
an application to stay judicial proceedings on the ground that the parties have agreed to
arbitrate.” Dallah, supra note 3, at ¶ 96 (emphasis added). Lord Collins cites Al-Naimi
(t/a Buildmaster Construction Servs) v. Islamic Press Agency, [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 522
(Ct. App.), and Albon (t/a NA Carriage Co.) v. Naza Motor Trading Sdn Bhd, [2008] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 1 (Ct. App.), for the proposition that “[w]here there is an application to stay
proceedings under section 9 of the 1996 Act, . . . the court will determine the issue of
whether there ever was an agreement to arbitrate.” Id. at ¶ 97.
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between themselves and private contracting parties. A State that is determined to
distance itself from its instrumentality and its instrumentality’s contracts will have
no difficulty insisting that the contract is structured in such a way as to achieve
that objective. The Cour d’appel was plainly uncomfortable interpreting and
applying French law in that fashion.
The UK Supreme Court was manifestly also interested in making broader
observations about the conduct of courts in the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, and more particularly about the level of scrutiny they
properly apply when reviewing findings of arbitral jurisdiction. The Court
properly saw no reason why courts that are asked to enforce foreign awards
should be more relaxed in their review than courts entertaining annulment actions
at the arbitral situs. It likewise properly saw no reason why courts of enforcement
should show deference to tribunals’ findings on arbitral jurisdiction, though it
understandably left open the elusive question of where permissible “examin[ation]
. . . with interest” of a tribunal’s findings on the jurisdictional issue ends and
impermissible deference to them begins. The Court’s conclusions on these two
vital questions are not limited to arbitrations against sovereign States, such as in
Dallah, but apply across the arbitration board.
Even with the benefit of the Dallah judgment, we are far from understanding
perfectly what courts are to do when entertaining challenges to the enforcement of
foreign awards based on claims, such as the nonexistence or invalidity of the
arbitration agreement, on which other courts and the arbitral tribunal itself will
already have opined. But, if the UK Supreme Court’s understanding of French
law was mistaken, as appears to be the case, the Court nevertheless contributed
positively to sorting through these larger systemic issues. The Court may not
have faced in Dallah the toughest of questions that may arise in relation to the
level of judicial scrutiny of the arbitration agreement at the award enforcement
stage, but it gave the questions that it did face sound and principled answers. The
Court’s answers to this series of questions will surely have far more lasting impact
on international commercial arbitration than its dubious account of the French law
on the binding effect of arbitration agreements on non-signatories.

